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ABSTRACT
e number of public and private web archives has increased, and
we implicitly trust content delivered by these archives. Fixity is
checked to ensure an archived resource has remained unaltered
since the time it was captured. Some web archives do not allow
users to access xity information and, more importantly, even if
xity information is available, it is provided by the same archive
from which the archived resources are requested. In this research,
we propose two approaches, namely Atomic and Block, to establish
and check xity of archived resources. In the Atomic approach,
the xity information of each archived web page is stored in a
JSON le (or a manifest), and published in a well-known web loca-
tion (an Archival Fixity server) before it is disseminated to several
on-demand web archives. In the Block approach, we rst batch
together xity information of multiple archived pages in a single
binary-searchable le (or a block) before it is published and dissem-
inated to archives. In both approaches, the xity information is
not obtained directly from archives. Instead, we compute the xity
information (e.g., hash values) based on the playback of archived
resources. One advantage of the Atomic approach is the ability to
verify xity of archived pages even with the absence of the Archival
Fixity server. e Block approach requires pushing fewer resources
into archives, and it performs xity verication faster than the
Atomic approach. On average, it takes about 1.25X, 4X, and 36X
longer to disseminate a manifest to perma.cc, archive.org, and
webcitation.org, respectively, than archive.is, while it takes
3.5X longer to disseminate a block to archive.org than perma.cc.
e Block approach performs 4.46X faster than the Atomic approach
on verifying the xity of archived pages.
1 INTRODUCTION
Web archives, such as the Internet Archive1 (IA) and UK Web
Archive2, have made great eorts to capture and archive the web to
allow access to prior states of web resources. We implicitly trust the
archived content delivered by such archives, but with the current
trend of extended use of other public and private web archives
[12, 15], we should consider the question of validity. For instance,
if a web page is archived in 1999 and replayed in 2019, how do we
know that it has not been tampered with during those 20 years?
One potential solution is to generate a cryptographic hash value
on the HTML content of an archived web page, or memento. A
memento is an archived version of an original web page [47]. Figure
1 shows an example where the cURL command downloads the raw
HTML code of the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20181219102034/https:/
/2019.jcdl.org/
1http://archive.org
2http://www.webarchive.org.uk/ukwa/
and then the hashing function sha256sum generates a SHA-256
hash on this downloaded code. By running these commands at
dierent times we should always expect to obtain the same hash.
In the context of web archiving, xity veries that archived re-
sources have remained unaltered since the time they were received
[11]. e nal report of the PREMIS Working Group [24] denes
information used for xity as “information used to verify whether
an object has been altered in an undocumented or unauthorized
way.” Web content tampering is a common Internet-related crime
in which content is altered by malicious users and activities [29].
Part of the problem is the lack of standard techniques that users
can apply to verify the xity of web content [5, 21]. Jinfang Niu
mentioned that none of the web archives declare the reliability
of the archived content in their servers, and some archives, such
as the Internet Archive, WAX3, and Government of Canada Web
Archive4, have a disclaimer stating that they are not responsible
for the reliability of the archived content they provide [39].
A motivating example, which shows the importance of verifying
xity of mementos, is the story of Joy-Ann Reid, an American cable
television host at MSNBC. In December 2017, she apologized for
writing several “insensitive” LGBT blog posts nearly a decade ago
when she was a morning radio talk show host in Florida [38, 38, 45].
In April 2018, Reid, supported by her lawyers, claimed that her blog
and/or the archived versions of the blog in the Internet Archive
had been compromised and the content was fabricated [18]. Even
though the Internet Archive denied that their archived pages had
been hacked [14], a stronger case could be made if we had an
independent service verifying that those archived blog posts had
not changed since they were captured by the archive. In this paper,
we are introducing two approaches, Atomic and Block, to make
archived web resources veriable.
In the Atomic approach, the xity information of each archived
web page is stored in a single JSON le, or manifest, published
on the web, and disseminated to several on-demand web archives.
In the Block approach, we batch together xity information, or
records, of multiple archived pages to a single binary-searchable
le, or block. e block then is published at a well-known web lo-
cation before disseminating to archives. While we make a chain of
blocks, we are not aempting to create yet another Blockchain [37].
Manifests’ chain of blocks are limited in scope as we do not need
to worry about consensus, eventual consistency, or proof-of-work
because these blocks are generated and published by a central au-
thority (the Block approach is described in 3.3). In both approaches,
the xity information, such as hash values, is not directly provided
by archives (server-side) even though some archives’ APIs (e.g., the
Internet Archive CDX server [25]) allow accessing such informa-
tion. Alternatively, we decided to calculate the xity information
3wax.lib.harvard.edu/collections/home.do
4www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/index-e.html
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$ curl -s https://web.archive.org/web/20181219102034id_/https://2019.jcdl.org/ | sha256sum
2769b5f71c64794ae76267b3a6385847e202bf0fd9fbcb8e0633427759fac128 -
Figure 1: Commands to generate a hash value of a memento.
based on the playback of archived resources (client-side) for two
reasons. First, we are not expecting hashes generated and stored
in WARC les by archives at crawl time to match those generated
on the playback of mementos [9]. Second, if an archive has been
compromised then it is likely the corresponding hashes have been
also compromised, so we need to have the xity information stored
in independent archives [36].
is work introduces a basic, yet extensible, format of xity
information in the form of a structured manifest le. However,
the main contribution of this paper focuses on the two suggested
approaches of disseminating xity information (or manifests) rather
than strength, applicability, extension, scope, or security of the
manifest. e framework describes how manifests are published,
discovered, and used to verify mementos. e proposed framework
does not require any change in the infrastructure of web archives.
It is built based on well-known standards, such as the Memento
protocol, and works with current archives’ APIs. e framework
allows for the generation of manifests for selected resources instead
of incurring the overhead of creating manifests for all archived
resources.
We show that the size of a manifest represents about 2% of an
actual memento’s content, and, on average, it takes about 1.25X,
4X, and 36X longer to disseminate a manifest to perma.cc, the
Internet Archive, and WebCite [20], respectively, than archive.is,
while it takes 3.5X longer to disseminate a block to archive.org
than perma.cc. e Block approach performs 4.46X faster than the
Atomic approach on verifying the xity of archived pages. is
paper is an expanded version of a conference paper [7].
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In order to automatically collect portions of the web, web archives
employ web crawling soware, such as the Internet Archive’s Her-
itrix [43]. Having a set of seed URIs placed in a queue, Heritrix will
start by fetching web pages identied by those URIs, and each time
a web page is downloaded, Heritrix writes the page to a WARC le
[27], extracts any URIs from the page, places those discovered URIs
in the queue, and repeats the process.
e crawling process will result in a set of archived pages, or
mementos. To provide access to their archived pages, many web
archives that use OpenWayback [26], the open-source implementa-
tion of IA’s Wayback Machine, to allow users to query the archive
by submiing a URI. OpenWayback will replay the content of any
selected archived web page in the browser. One of the main tasks
of OpenWayback is to ensure that when replaying a web page from
an archive, all resources that are used to construct the page (e.g.,
images, style sheets, and JavaScript les) should be retrieved from
the archive, not from the live web. us, at the time of replaying
the page, OpenWayback will rewrite all links to those resources
to point directly to the archive [46]. In addition to OpenWayback,
PyWb [30] is another replaying tool, which is used by Perma [49]
and Webrecorder [31].
Memento [48] is an HTTP protocol extension that uses time as
a dimension to access the web by relating current web resources
to their prior states. e Memento protocol is supported by most
public web archives including the Internet Archive. e protocol
introduces two HTTP headers for content negotiation. First, Accept-
Datetime is an HTTP Request header through which a client can
request a prior state of a web resource by providing the preferred
datetime (e.g., Accept-Datetime: Mon, 09 Jan 2017 11:21:57 GMT ).
Second, the Memento-Datetime HTTP Response header is sent by a
server to indicate the datetime at which the resource was captured.
e Memento protocol also denes the following terminology:
- URI-R - an original resource from the live Web
- URI-M - an archived version (memento) of the original resource
at a particular point in time
- URI-T - a resource (TimeMap) that provides a list of mementos
(URI-Ms) for a particular original resource
- URI-G - a resource (TimeGate) that supports content negotiation
based on datetime to access prior versions of an original resource
To establish trust in repositories and web archives, dierent
publications and standards have emphasized the importance of ver-
ifying xity of archived resources. e report Trusted Repositories
Audit & Certication (TRAC) by the Task Force on Archiving of
Digital Information introduces criteria for identifying trusted digi-
tal repositories [17]. In addition to the ability to reliably provide
access, preserve, and migrate digital resources, digital repositories
which include web archives must create preservation metadata that
can be used to verify that content is not tampered with or corrupted
(xity) according to sections B2.9 and B4.4. e report recommends
that preserved content is stored separately from xity information,
so it is less likely that someone is able to alter both the content
and its associated xity information [17]. us, generating xity
information and using it to ensure that archived resources are valid
will help to establish trust in web archives. Eltgrowth [19] outlined
several judicial decisions that involve evidence (i.e., archived web
pages) taken from the Internet Archive. e author mentions that
there is an open question whether to consider an archived web
page as a duplicate of the original web page at a particular time
in the past. is concern might prevent considering archived web
pages as evidence.
Dierent vulnerabilities were discovered in the Internet Archive’s
Wayback Machine by Lerner et al. [35] and Berlin [13]. ey are
Archive-Escapes, Same-Origin Escapes, Archive-Escapes + Same-
Origin Escapes, and Anachronism-Injection. Aackers can leverage
these vulnerabilities to modify a user’s view at the time when a
memento is rendered in a browser. e authors suggested some
defenses that could be deployed by either web archives or web
publishers to prevent abusing these vulnerabilities. Cushman and
Kreymer created a shared repository in May 2017 to describe po-
tential threats in web archives, such as controlling a user’s account
due to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) or Cross-Site Scripting
(XSS), and archived web resources reaching out to the live web
[16]. e authors provide recommendations on how to avoid such
threats. Rosenthal et al. [42], on the other hand, described several
threats against the content of digital preservation systems (e.g., web
archives). e authors indicated that designers of archives must be
aware of threats, such as media failure, hardware failure, soware
failure, communication errors, failure of network services, media
hardware obsolescence, soware obsolescence, operator error, nat-
ural disaster, external aack, internal aack, economic failure, and
organizational failure.
Several tools have been developed to generate trusted times-
tamps. For example, OriginStamp [23] allows users to generate a
trusted timestamp using blockchain-based networks on any le,
plain text, or a hash value. e data is hashed in the user’s browser
and the resulting hash is sent to OriginStamp’s server which then
will be added to a list of all hashes submied by other users. Once
per day, OriginStamp generates a single aggregated hash of all
received hashes. is aggregated hash is converted to a Bitcoin
address that will be a part of a new Bitcoin transaction. e times-
tamp associated with the transaction is considered a trusted times-
tamp. A user can verify a timestamp through OriginStamp’s API
or by visiting their website. Other services, such as Chainpoint
(chainpoint.org) and OpenTimestamps (opentimestamps.org),
are based on the same concept of using blockchain-based networks
to timestamp digital documents. Even though users of these ser-
vices can pass data by value, they are not allowed to submit data by
reference (i.e., passing a URI of a web page). In other words, these
tools are not directly timestamping web pages. e only exception
is a service [22] established by OriginStamp that accepts URIs from
users, but the service is no longer available on the live web at
www.isg.uni-konstanz.de/web-time-stamps/
A number of problems with blockchain-based networks are descibed
by Rosenthal [41]. He indicates that having a large number of
independent nodes in the network is what makes it secure, but
this is not the case with many blockchain-based services, such as
Ethereum (www.ethereum.org).
ere are issues related to how web archives preserve and pro-
vide access to mementos that make it dicult to generate repeatable
xity information. When serving mementos, web archives oen
apply some transformation to appropriately replay content in the
user’s browser. is includes (1) adding archive-specic code to the
original content, (2) rewriting links to embedded resources (e.g., im-
ages) within an archived page so these resources are retrieved from
the archive, not from the live web, and (3) serving content in dier-
ent le formats like images (or screenshots), ZIP les, and WARC
format [1]. Furthermore, issues, such as reconstructing archived
web pages, caching, dynamic/randomly-generated content, illus-
trate how dicult it is to generate repeatable xity information.
Taking into account all of these archive-related issues, it becomes
a challenging problem to distinguish between legitimate changes
by archives and malicious changes. In our technical report [9] we
provide several recommendations of how to generate repeatable
xity information.
Figure 2: An example showing an original URI vs. a trusty URI.
Kuhn et al. [32] dene a trusty URI as a URI that contains a
cryptographic hash value of the content it identies as shown in
Figure 2.
With the assumption that a trusty URI, once created, is linked
from other resources or stored by a third party, it becomes possible
to detect if the content that the trusty URI identies has been
tampered with or manipulated on the way (e.g., to prevent man-in-
the-middle aacks [34]). In their second paper [33], they introduce
two dierent modules to allow creating trusty URIs on dierent
kinds of content. In the module F, the hash is calculated on the
byte-level le content, while in the second module R, the hash is
calculated on RDF graphs. Even though trusty URIs detect altered
documents, there are some limitations. First, a trusty URI is created
by an owner of a resource it identies. Second, trusty URIs can be
generated on only two types of content RDF graphs and byte-level
content (i.e., no modules introduced for HTML documents).
3 METHODOLOGY
e process of xity verication of mementos can broadly be de-
scribed in three phases: 1) generating manifests for mementos, 2)
disseminating those manifests into dierent web archives, and 3) at
a later date, generating manifests of the current state and compar-
ing them with their corresponding previously archived versions.
We have two approaches of manifest dissemination, namely, Atomic
and Block (as described in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively).
3.1 Manifest Generation
A manifest (identied by URI-Manif) consists of metadata summa-
rizing xity information of a memento. A manifest can be generated
at or aer a memento’s creation datetime. e proposed structure
of a manifest le is illustrated in Figure 3, and should have the
following properties:
@context: It species the URI where names used in the manifest
le are dened.
created: e creation datetime of the manifest. It must be equal to
or greater than the memento’s creation datetime.
URI-R, URI-M, and Memento-Datetime: It refers to the URI of
an original resource, the URI of a memento, and the datetime when
a memento was created, respectively [48].
@id: e URI that identies a published manifest le (URI-Manif).
http-headers: Selected HTTP Response headers of the memento.
As proposed by Jones et al. [28], we insert the Preference-Applied
header to specify options used to retrieve the memento. For ex-
ample, Original-Content refers to the raw memento—accessing
{ "@context": "http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/",
"created": "Sun, 23 Dec 2018 11:43:55 GMT",
"@id": "http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181223114355/c6ad485819abbe20e37c0632843081710c
95f94829f59bbe3b6ad3251d93f7d2/https://web.archive.org/web/20181219102034/https://2019.jcdl
.org/",
"uri-r": "https://2019.jcdl.org/",
"uri-m": "https://web.archive.org/web/20181219102034/https://2019.jcdl.org/",
"memento-datetime": "Wed, 19 Dec 2018 10:20:34 GMT",
"http-headers": {
"Content-Type": "text/html; charset=UTF-8",
"X-Archive-Orig-date": "Wed, 19 Dec 2018 10:20:36 GMT",
"X-Archive-Orig-link": "<https://2019.jcdl.org/wp-json/>; rel=\"https://api.w.org/\"",
"Preference-Applied": "original-links, original-content"
},
"hash-constructor": "(curl -s '$uri-m' && echo -n '$Content-Type $X-Archive-Orig-date $X-Archive-O
rig-link') | tee >(sha256sum) >(md5sum) >/dev/null | cut -d ' ' -f 1 | paste
-d':' <(echo -e 'md5\nsha256') - | paste -d' ' - -",
"hash": "md5:969d7aba4c16444a6544bdc39eefe394 sha256:c68a215eb1c3edbf51f565b9a87f49646456369e5179
1a86106a6667630737a6" }
Figure 3: A manifest showing xity information of the memento hps://web.archive.org/web/20181219102034/hps://2019.jcdl.org/
unaltered archived content because archives by default return the
memento aer transforming its content.
hash-constructor: e commands that calculate hashes. e vari-
able $uri-m is replaced with the uri-m value and the selected head-
ers (e.g., $Content-Type) are replaced with the corresponding val-
ues in the http-headers e hashes are generated on both the
HTML of a memento and selected response headers, and they are
calculated using two dierent hashing algorithms, MD5 and SHA256,
so even if the two functions are vulnerable to collision aacks, it
becomes dicult for an aacker to make both functions collide at
the same time [40].
hash: e hash values calculated based on commands dened in
hash-constructor.
3.2 Atomic Dissemination
In the Atomic approach, each memento that we are interested in
verifying should have at least one corresponding manifest le con-
taining xity information of the memento. Once generated, the
manifest should be published on the web and disseminated to dier-
ent web archives. e main concept of this approach is to store the
xity information of a memento in dierenent archives in addition
to the archive in which the memento is preserved. is practice is
recommended by the TRAC report [17] where content is maintained
separately from its xity information. Disseminating manifests can
be archived through four steps:
(1) Push a web page into one or more archives. is will create
one or more mementos, URI-M.
(2) Generate a manifest by computing the xity information
of the memento.
(3) Publish the manifest at a well-known location, URI-Manif.
(4) Disseminate the published manifest in multiple archives.
is will generate archived manifests, URI-M-Manif.
We briey describe the steps involved in generating, publishing,
and disseminating xity information of mementos with examples.
https://archive.is/20181224085310/
https://2019.jcdl.org/
https://web.archive.org/web/201812
24085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
https://perma-archives.org/warc/201
81224085330/https://2019.jcdl.org/
http://www.webcitation.org74tsy6pU0
https://2019.
jcdl.org/
Figure 4: A web page is pushed into multiple archives:
archive.org, archive.is, perma.cc, and webcitation.org.
Figure 4 shows the web page https://2019.jcdl.org pushed
into multiple archives, resulting in four mementos. e Python
module ArchiveNow can be invoked via the command-line interface
or user interface for simultaneously disseminating a web page into
on-demand web archives [8].
Next, as shown in Figure 5, for each memento, a manifest is
generated and published on the web at the Archival Fixity server,
http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu
so that archives are able to access and capture those manifests. For
example, the manifest of the memento
web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.
jcdl.org/
is available at the URI-Manif
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
is URI-Manif is a generic URI, which means if the Archival Fix-
ity server creates another manifest for the same memento (marked
in red), the server will publish it using the same generic URI. For
this reason, the generic URI must always redirect to the most recent
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/
https://archive.is/20181224085310/h
ttps://2019.jcdl.org/
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/
https://web.archive.org/web/2018122
4085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/
https://perma-archives.org/warc/201
81224085330/https://2019.jcdl.org/
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/
http://www.webcitation.org/74tsy6pU0
Figure 5: Compute xity and publish it on the web
manifest of a memento (i.e., the manifest that is published using a
trusty URI), so requesting the manifest’s generic URI
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
will result in “302 Redirect” to the trusty URI (Figure 6)
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181224093024/8c
31ccfbb3a664c9160f98be466b7c9fb9afa80580ab5052001174
be59c6a73a/https://web.archive.org/web/2018122408532
9/https://2019.jcdl.org/
Figure 7 shows an example of retrieving all mementos (the
TimeMap) from the Internet Archive of the URI-Manif:
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
As Figure 8 shows, requesting the memento of the manifest (with
generic URI) found in the TimeMap results in 302 Redirect to the
archived manifest (with the trusty URI).
is 302 Redirect from the generic URI to the trusty URI has
two advantages. First, as we described in Section 2, having a trusty
URI will help validate the manifest content, as the hash included in
the URI is the hash of the content it identies. Second and more
importantly, we can use the generic URI to discover manifests in
the Archival Fixity server and archived manifests in the archives.
erefore, even in cases where the Archival Fixity server is unavail-
able or compromised we still can discover manifests in the archives
directly (e.g., using a TimeGate or TimeMap). Figure 10 shows how
the live web, the archive, and the Archival Fixity server are related
in the Atomic approach.
Generally, we build trust in the content of memento from the time
when xity information is computed and published. One of the best
scenarios is when a manifest is generated at ingest by the archive.
In other words, the archive crawls a web page and immediately
aer that computes and publishes its xity information.
e nal step is to push the published manifest into multiple
archives. In the example shown in Figure 9, the xity information
(or the manifest) of the memento from archive.org is disseminated
to the same archive and other three archives including archive.is,
perma-archives.org, and webcitation.org.
3.3 Block Dissemination
As opposed to the Atomic approach, in the Block approach we batch
multiple manifests together in a single binary-searchable le along
with some additional metadata (using the UKVS le format [3, 4]),
and add the reference of the previously published latest block. en,
we generate the content-addressable identity of the block, compress
it, and archive it into multiple web archives by making it available at
a well-known content-addressable URI (and allow people to keep lo-
cal copies anywhere). While we make a chain of blocks, we are not
aempting to create yet another Blockchain [37]. Manifests’ chain
of blocks are limited in scope as we do not need to worry about con-
sensus, eventual consistency, or proof-of-work because these blocks
are generated and published by a central authority. Linking blocks
in a chain using their content-addressable hashes provides tamper-
proong, and enables discovery of previous blocks (starting from
the latest or anywhere in the middle of the chain). Additionally, as
long as we are depending on an archived page to be available in
the archive, we can count on the archived metadata about the page
to be available too. Creation and dissemination of manifest blocks
is performed in the following steps:
(1) Identify a set of URI-Ms for their manifests to be included
in the same block (a strategically chosen set may improve
block compression factor and enable a more ecient lookup
for verication later).
(2) Generate their individual manifests in the form of a single-
line JSON le (exclude @id eld, needed in case of records
being placed in a block, and eliminate many common elds
that can go in the headers of the block).
(3) Prex each manifest JSON line with the Sort-friendly URI
Reordering Transform (SURT) [44] of the corresponding
URI-M.
(4) Write these lines in a UKVS le along with the metadata
headers as illustrated in Figure 13.
(5) Add the content-addressable hash of the latest published
block in the metadata as the previous block.
(6) Sort the le using LC ALL=C locale.
(7) Calculate the content-addressable hash (e.g., SHA256) of
this block.
(8) Name the le using its content-addressable hash.
(9) Compress the block le to eciently archive it.
(10) Publish the compressed block le on a URI that contains
its hash.
(11) Make the entrypoint (the well-known URI) redirect to the
latest block’s URI (as illustrated in Figure 11).
(12) Add Link response header with appropriate links to nav-
igate through the chain of blocks, which is visually illus-
trated on the landing page as shown in Figure 12 (a similar
approach of creating bidirectional linked list of HTTP mes-
sages was used in the HTTPMailbox [2]).
(13) Archive the entrypoint in multiple web archives, which
will implicitly archive the latest block as well due to the
redirect.
(14) Optionally, for further tamper-proong post the URI of
the newly published block on immutable platforms not
controlled by a single authority (e.g., Twier and GitHub’s
Gist).
$ curl -sIL https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https
://2019.jcdl.org/ | egrep -i "(HTTP/|ˆlocation:)"
HTTP/2 302
location: https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181224093024/8c31ccfbb3a664c9160f98be466b7c9fb9a
fa80580ab5052001174be59c6a73a/https://web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
HTTP/2 200
Figure 6: e manifest identied with the generic URI redirects to the manifest with the trusty URI.
$ curl -i http://web.archive.org/web/timemap/link/https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web
.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.15.8
Date: Wed, 01 May 2019 05:38:20 GMT
Content-Type: application/link-format
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-App-Server: wwwb-app38
X-ts: ----
X-location: cdx-p
X-Cache-Key: httpweb.archive.org/web/timemap/link/https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web
.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/US
X-Page-Cache: MISS
<http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl
.org/>; rel="original",
<http://web.archive.org/web/timemap/link/https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive
.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/>; rel="self"; type="application/link-format"; from="Mon,
24 Dec 2018 09:33:54 GMT",
<http://web.archive.org>; rel="timegate",
<http://web.archive.org/web/20181224093354/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive
.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/>; rel="first memento"; datetime="Mon, 24 Dec 2018 09:33:5
4 GMT",
Figure 7: Retreiving the TimeMap of a manifest from the Internet Archive. In this example, the TimeMap contains only one memento.
$ curl -sIL http://web.archive.org/web/20181224093354/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://
web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/ | egrep -i "(HTTP/|ˆlocation:)"
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://web.archive.org/web/20181224093354/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/2018122409
3024/8c31ccfbb3a664c9160f98be466b7c9fb9afa80580ab5052001174be59c6a73a/https://web.archive.org/web/201812
24085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
HTTP/1.1 302 FOUND
Location: http://web.archive.org/web/20181224093355/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/2018122409
3024/8c31ccfbb3a664c9160f98be466b7c9fb9afa80580ab5052001174be59c6a73a/https://web.archive.org/web/201812
24085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Figure 8: e archived manifest with the generic URI redirects to the archived manifest with the trusty URI.
Although the number of public web archives is increasing [12,
15], only a few of them support an on-demand web archiving ser-
vice. However, a small number (greater than one) of independent
on-demand archives can suce for of the purpose of disseminating
manifests. e Block dissemination approach has a number of ad-
vantages over the Atomic approach. It requires far fewer network
requests to push it to web archives and creates signicantly fewer
independently published manifest resources to keep track of me-
mentos. By bundling multiple manifests in a single le, it yields
a signicant compression factor due to the repeated boilerplate
content in each manifest le. As web archives die and new ones
come to life, these blocks can be replicated and migrated externally
to other places eciently, while in the case of the Atomic approach
we might lose historical manifests as old web archives die without
donating their holdings to live archives. Moreover, these blocks are
https://archive.is/20181224093334/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/h
ttps://web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
https://web.archive.org/web/20181224093355/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/m
anifest/https://web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
https://perma-archives.org/warc/20181224093354/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.e
du/manifest/https://web.archive.org/web/20181224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
http://www.webcitation.org/74tvdsyxe
manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest
/https://web.archive.org/web/20181
224085329/https://2019.jcdl.org/
Figure 9: Push the xity information into multiple archives
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Figure 10: e Atomic approach. e generic URI (URI-Manif) redirects to the most recent trusty URI, so when the archive captures the
generic URI, the archive follows the 302 Redirect and captures the trusty URI as well. is gure is a modied version of an original
diagram contributed by Herbert Van de Sompel (from DANS).
more tamper-proof than atomic manifests due to chaining. On the
other hand, the Block approach has the disadvantage of shiing the
burden of lookup of a specic record in the entire chain of blocks
to the user or a service that provides verication. While individ-
ual blocks are binary searchable for fast lookup, as the number of
blocks increases, one has to scan through all of them. However, this
can easily be solved by scanning the entire chain once and creating
a search index over the SURT eld.
3.4 Verifying Fixity of Mementos
Verifying the xity of a memento in both the Atomic and Block
approaches can be achieved through three common steps:
(a) For the given memento, discover one or more manifests
URI-Manif. In the Atomic approach, this step requires also
discovering archived copies URI-M-Manif of the manifest.
(b) Recompute current xity information of the memento.
(c) Compare current xity information with discovered mani-
fests.
In the Atomic approach, we can discover a manifest of a given
memento through the Archival Fixity server. Which manifest is
returned depends on the server’s API. For example, the server may
respond with the closest manifest to the memento’s creation date
or return the manifest that is closest to a given datetime (i.e., via a
TimeGate). Once a manifest is discovered, we may use TimeGates
and/or TimeMaps to retrieve its archived copies available in web
archives. Again, it is possible to discover archived manifests us-
ing the generic URI even without the Archival Fixity server being
involved. Next, we compute current xity information by gener-
ating a new manifest for the given memento. en, we compare
current hash values in the new manifest with the hashes in the
discovered archived manifests. In this compression step, we should
only consider independent copies of the manifest. For example,
$ curl -IL https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks
HTTP/2 302
content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 22:27:14 GMT
location: https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks/59bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604e
db2a8e3e89540b
server: ArchivalFixity/0.1
content-length: 417
HTTP/2 200
accept-ranges: bytes
cache-control: immutable
content-disposition: attachment; filename="59bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8e3e8
9540b.ukvs.gz"
content-encoding: gzip
content-type: application/ukvs
date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 22:27:14 GMT
etag: "59bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8e3e89540b"
expires: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 10:27:14 GMT
last-modified: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 18:19:00 GMT
link: <https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks/59bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8
e3e89540b>; rel="self", <https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks/3c4575450979f4283ffb5a1b385450a
c4c82f1b746de34385dbc177e493a6096>; rel="prev", <https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks/7bbf757
046ac0a0a60015a1cb847c3189160d18c809b210073822df157609e01>; rel="first", <https://manifest.ws-dl.
cs.odu.edu/blocks/59bc17511de502b7a7bdf39b2020c3bd4ad08aaefd7135604edb2a8e3e89540b>; rel="last"
server: ArchivalFixity/0.1
content-length: 15227
Figure 11: Blocks Access API
if an archived manifest is delivered from the same archive where
the memento is from, then this copy of the manifest should not be
considered independent. In other cases, two manifests might be dis-
covered in two cooperating archives (e.g., we know Archive-It.org
is a service established by the Internet Archive).
In case of the Block approach, the xity verication server (or any
equivalent tool) needs to have access to all the blocks, either over
HTTP (e.g., from a web archive) or stored locally. ese blocks are
then scanned for one or more matching records for the given URI-M.
Corresponding single-line JSON entries (as shown in Figure 13) are
extracted as historical xity records for comparison. Remaining
steps for creating current xity information, comparing with the
historical records, and generating the response summary are the
same as in the case of Atomic approach.
While due to the immutable nature of blocks we can only have
back references, creating a single linked list pointing from the most
recent blocks to the older ones, with the help of some external
metadata our archival xity block server provides bidirectional nav-
igational links for easy navigation along the chain back and forth
(as illustrated in Figure 11 with first, last, prev, and next link
relations in the link header). e content of these blocks is sorted
that enables fast lookup in each block using binary search, but the
chain of blocks has to be scanned linearly, which can decrease the
throughput as the number of blocks increases. To deal with this
issue, one can create an inverted index of existing blocks, treating
URI-Ms as the keyword and blocks as the document. Additionally,
the chain of blocks is in chronological order, which makes it easy
to create a lightweight skip index to identify segments of the chain
that were created around certain points of time in the past. Creat-
ing large blocks with a slowly growing chain will be more ecient
than a rapidly growing chain of small blocks. However, an optimal
block size can be decided based on how long one is willing to wait
for enough records to be available for a new block creation and
on the largest size of a single block that can easily be stored in
web archives. Creating blocks with strategically grouped URI-Ms
(e.g., mementos of nearby datetime values, URI-Rs from a set of
domains, or URI-Ms from a set of archives) can also improve the
eciency of lookup (or indexing).
4 EVALUATION
We conducted a study on 1,000 mementos from the Internet Archive
which are a subset of a larger set of URI-Ms involved in a dier-
ent research project [10]. We did not take the size of mementos
into consideration (i.e., the number of embedded resources, such
as images and JavaScript/CSS les) because xity in this paper is
computed based on only the returned raw HTML content of the
base le. e main reason for choosing a small set, only 1,000 URI-
Ms, is because the study requires pushing at least 12 manifests for
each memento in multiple archives. Sending too many archiving
requests to archives might result in technical issues, such as block-
ing IP addresses. For example, webcitation.org responded with
“WebCite has agged your IP address for suspicious activity” aer
making 100 requests, but the issue was resolved aer contacting the
archive. Perma.cc on the other hand allows users to freely submit a
Figure 12: e landing page showing a chain of blocks.
maximum of 10 URIs for preserving per month. Fortunately, the
archive supported us for this study by increasing this limit, so we
were able to disseminate more manifests to the archive. Part of eval-
uation is measuring the time it takes to generate, disseminate, and
verify manifests in the Atomic and Block approaches. In addition,
we want to compare the size of les created in both approaches and
whether all mementos are going to be veried successfully.
We wrote Python scripts [6] for performing dierent functions:
generate atomic(): Accepts a URI-M and returns the lename
of a JSON le containing the xity information of the memento.
We generated 3,000 manifests. e main purpose of generating
three manifests for each memento is because we are interested
in reporting the average time for generating a manifest for each
memento. Figure 14 shows an example of generating a manifest of
the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://
www.whitehouse.org
The resulting JSON le contains the xity information including
the hash calculated on the returned HTML of the memento.
publish atomic(): Submits a given JSON to the Archival Fixity
server at
https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu
The server will insert @id and created metadata before publishing
the new manifest on the web. Figure 15 shows an example of
publishing the manifest le generated previously (in Figure 14). It
returns the generic URI of the manifest URI-Manif and the trusty
URI.
disseminate atomic(): Pushes a published manifest into dierent
archives using ArchiveNow. In our study, we used archive.org,
archive.is, perma.cc, and webcitation.org resulting in cre-
ating 12,000 archived manifests (i.e., 3,000 URI-M-Manif in each
archive). We used the Generic URI to push manifest into archives.
Again, this URI always redirects to the trusty URI. If archives con-
sider a “302 Redirect” as a separate resource, then the total number
of archived resources created in the four archives was 24,000. Figure
16 shows an example of disseminating to four archives the manifest
http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://
web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://www.whit
ehouse.org
verify atomic(): Accepts a URI-M, It discovers a manifest closest
to the memento’s creation datetime. In addition, the function dis-
covers archived copies of the manifest in the four archives using
TimeGates and TimeMaps. en, it computes current xity in-
formation using generate atomic(). Finally, it compares current
xity information with the discovered manifests and their archived
copies. As a result, for each URI-M, the function returns either
“Veried” or “Failed” with other information, such as hash values,
URI-Manifs, and URI-M-Manifs. Figure 17 shows an example of
verifying the xity of the memento
https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://
www.whitehouse.org.
generate block(): Accepts multiple JSON les. It generates one or
more blocks depending on the selected block size. In this study, we
set it to 100 manifests per block, so the total number of generated
blocks was 10. e example in Figure 18 shows the output of the
shell script generate block.sh, which uses the Python function
generate block() to generate ten 100-record blocks. Figure 19
shows only four records (out of 100) of block 1. e four records
have the xity information of the following mementos:
• https://web.archive.org/web/19961022175434/http:
//www.search.com:80
• https://web.archive.org/web/19961023041557/http:
//www.aaas.org:80/
• https://web.archive.org/web/19961219082428/http:
//www.sho.com:80/
• https://web.archive.org/web/19961223174001/http:
//www2.reference.com:80/
disseminate block(): Pushes a block into two archives (archive.
org and perma.cc). Again, because we are interested in calculating
the average time of disseminating block, each block is pushed three
time into both archives resulting in creating 60 archived blocks (i.e.,
30 per archive). We did not use archive.is and webcitation.org
because .gz les were not handled correctly by those archives. Fig-
ure 20 shows an example of disseminating a block to two archives.
!context ["http://oduwsdl.github.io/contexts/fixity"]
!fields {keys: ["surt"]}
!id {uri: "https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/"}
!meta {created_at: "20190111181327"}
!meta {prev_block: "sha256:d4eb1190f9aaae9542fd3ad8a3c4519450cfb00845b632eb2b3f4f098a34144d"}
!meta {type: "FixityBlock"}
org,archive,web)/web/19961022175434/http://search.com/ {<Single line JSON as illustrated in Figure 2>}
org,archive,web)/web/19961219082428/http://sho.com/ {<Single line JSON>}
org,archive,web)/web/19961223174001/http://reference.com/ {<Single line JSON>}
...
Figure 13: A sample Block with metadata headers and records
$ python fixity.py generate_atomic https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://www.whitehouse.org
43423e8ad464461ec196c21033451c07b71b1ec4fbd3be013e3235093abac56b.json
Figure 14: An example of generating a manifest of a memento.
$ python fixity.py publish_atomic 43423e8ad464461ec196c21033451c07b71b1ec4fbd3be013e3235093abac56b.json
http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://www.whiteho
use.org
http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181212013507/43423e8ad464461ec196c21033451c07b71b1ec4fbd3be
013e3235093abac56b/https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://www.whitehouse.org
Figure 15: An example of publishing a manifest at the Archival Fixity server.
$ python fixity.py disseminate_atomic http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/https://web.archive.org
/web/20051123211159/http://www.whitehouse.org
http://archive.is/egyVY
https://perma.cc/VMQ3-E45U
http://www.webcitation.org/74bAo5hJ4
https://web.archive.org/web/20181212013856/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181212013507/434
23e8ad464461ec196c21033451c07b71b1ec4fbd3be013e3235093abac56b/https://web.archive.org/web/2005112321115
9/http://www.whitehouse.org
Figure 16: An example of disseminating a manifest to four archives.
verify block(): Accepts a URI-M, and discovers xity information
of the URI-M from the published blocks. en, it computes current
xity information using generate atomic(). Finally, it compares
current and discovered xity. e function returns either “Veried”
or “Failed” with other information, such as hash values. Figure 21
shows the output of verify block() for only 10 mementos (out
of 1,000).
In addition to the Python scripts, we implemented the Archival
Fixity server that is responsible for publishing and discovering
manifests and blocks. For example, Figure 22 shows a request for
discovering the closest manifest’s creation date to December 22,
2018 for the given memento. e server response indicates that the
closest manifest was created on December 12, 2018.
e selected number of records per block aects the total size of
all blocks and the time required to generate these blocks. Figure
23 illustrates that creating large blocks with a slowly growing
chain is more ecient than a rapidly growing chain of small blocks.
As mentioned in Section 3.4, one factor of choosing the optimal
number of records in each block is the largest size of a single block
that can easily be stored in web archives. For example, we tested
the Internet Archive (IA) to identify the largest single le that the
archive can accept for preservation. Aer submiing multiple les
with dierent sizes, we found that IA can accept up to 800 MB,
beyond that the archive returns “504 Gateway Time-out”.
5 RESULTS
Figure 24 illustrates the distribution of the average time taken to
generate manifests. We generated three manifests for each me-
mento, and calculated the average time, so the the total number of
generated manifests is 3,000. e manifest generation time includes:
1) downloading the raw HTML content using the Requests mod-
ule in Python, 2) calculating xity information of the downloaded
$ python fixity.py generate_atomic https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://www.whitehouse.org
0c6c4f7435a79e9a756fb892dc602f9cd1e71a7f74b0346d999b6c1834c703a4.json
$ python fixity.py verify_atomic 0c6c4f7435a79e9a756fb892dc602f9cd1e71a7f74b0346d999b6c1834c703a4.json
Current hash: md5:c4cf615c62a14df9ac2d610873794555 sha256:e5832410226e1e9637eb9fb7c97cf2065851fb106b925
1412e2821965e02305c
5 matched manifests:
http://archive.is/egyVY
https://perma.cc/VMQ3-E45U
http://www.webcitation.org/74bAo5hJ4
http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181212013507/43423e8ad464461ec196c21033451c07b71b1e
c4fbd3be013e3235093abac56b/https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://www.whitehouse.org
https://web.archive.org/web/20181212013856/http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/2018121201
3507/43423e8ad464461ec196c21033451c07b71b1ec4fbd3be013e3235093abac56b/https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20051123211159/http://www.whitehouse.org
0 mismatched manifests:
Figure 17: An example of verifying the xity of the memento https://web.archive.org/web/20051123211159/http://www.
whitehouse.org. e current xity information should be generated rst. en, the function verify atomic() nds a published manifest
in the Archival Fixity server and its archived versions in web archives. Finally, the function compares current xity information with the
xity information in the discovered manifest and its archived captures.
content, and 3) storing the xity information locally in JSON for-
mat. e average size of the generated manifest les is 1,157 bytes.
is size represents 2.79% of the actual download HTML content,
which is 41,392 bytes on average. e total size of all manifests is
1,156,657 bytes, while the total size of the blocks is 176,128 bytes.
is indicates that the Block approach requires less storage space
than the Atomic approach to store xity information of the same
number of mementos.
As expected, the time for disseminating manifests and blocks was
the maximum time compared with other operations, such as gener-
ating and verifying manifests. Figure 25 shows that pushing mani-
fests into webcitation.org (or WebCite) takes much longer time
than other archives. On average, we wait for 33.82 seconds before
WebCite nishes processing an archival request of a manifest, while
the manifest disseminating average time drops down dramatically
in the other three archives as Table 1 indicates. We observed that
archive.org and webcitation.org add a few seconds response
delay aer receiving the rst tens of archiving requests. In sum, it
takes about 1.25X, 4X, and 36X longer to disseminate a manifest
to perma.cc, archive.org, and webcitation.org, respectively,
than archive.is, while it takes 3.5X longer to disseminate a block
to archive.org than perma.cc. e average dissemination time
of blocks in archive.org and perma.cc is shown in Figure 26.
Given a collection of N mementos and K web archives, the total
number of resources that we are creating in the K archives by the
Atomic and Block approaches are (N ∗K) and (k∗(N /B)) respectively,
whereB is the selected block size. In our study, N = 1, 000, katomic =
4, kblock = 2, and B = 100. en a total of 12, 000 resources were
created by the Atomic approach and only 60 resources were created
by the Block approach considering the fact that we repeated the
dissemination process for three times.
Figure 27 shows the time required to discover manifests of each
memento from the Archival Fixity server. Figure 28 illustates the to-
tal time for verifying the xity of all mementos by both approaches.
Table 1: Average time (in seconds) for disseminating and down-
loading of manifests and blocks.
Operation archive.is perma.cc IA WebCite
Manifest dissemination 0.94 1.18 3.74 33.82
Block dissemination - 1.37 4.80 -
Manifest download 0.47 0.60 1.42 4.55
Block download - 0.30 7.19 -
e verication time includes discovering manifests, computing
current xity information, downloading copies of manifests (in the
Atomic approach), and comparing manifests. On average, the veri-
cation time of a memento is 6.65 seconds by the Atomic approach
and 1.49 seconds by the Block approach, so the Block approach per-
forms 4.46X faster than the Atomic approach on verifying the xity
of memento. Although we have predicted that some mementos
might not be veried for reasons like an archive responds with
“HTTP 500 Error”, we have not yet encountered any failed cases
(i.e., all mementos are veried successfully).
6 CONCLUSIONS
Most web archives do not allow users to access xity information.
Even if xity information is accessible, it is provided by the same
archive delivering content. In this proposal, we have described
two approaches, Atomic and Block, for generating and verifying
xity of archived web pages. e proposed work does not require
any change in the infrastructure of web archives and is built based
on well-known standards, such as the Memento protocol. While
a central service is used to create manifests, this approach does
not exclude additional, centralized manifest servers, possibly tai-
lored to specic communities. e Block approach creates fewer
resources in archives and reduces xity verication time, while
the Atomic approach has the ability to verify xity of archived
$./generate_blocks.sh
Input: urims.txt
Output Dir: ./blocks/100
Block Size: 100
Num Blocks: 10
======================
[1548318100009] Generating block 1
[1548318100348] Saving 87606 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082140-00000000000000000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000000-dfbbe3600d5fe4e51c895db94cb9e9cfd0eb04716d9e4be6e63cf8ac3f3e9233.ukvs
[1548318100350] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082140-000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000000000000-dfbbe3600d5fe4e51c895db94cb9e9cfd0eb04716d9e4be6e63cf8ac3f3e9233.ukvs.gz
[1548318100356] Finished creating block 1 of size 15174 bytes in 347 milliseconds
======================
[1548318101360] Generating block 2
[1548318101686] Saving 82971 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082141-dfbbe3600d5fe4e51c895db94cb9e9cfd0eb04
716d9e4be6e63cf8ac3f3e9233-861f2b2e872125f31a61bed8141f1c8be04c48ebbebb2a49b4fdf2d9d6999f77.ukvs
[1548318101688] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082141-dfbbe3600d5fe4e51c895db94cb9e9cfd0eb047
16d9e4be6e63cf8ac3f3e9233-861f2b2e872125f31a61bed8141f1c8be04c48ebbebb2a49b4fdf2d9d6999f77.ukvs.gz
[1548318101693] Finished creating block 2 of size 14233 bytes in 333 milliseconds
======================
[1548318102695] Generating block 3
[1548318103017] Saving 84359 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082143-861f2b2e872125f31a61bed8141f1c8be04c48
ebbebb2a49b4fdf2d9d6999f77-213c79bda7483d87609287142b86bc8d6b8c66306662236455507be046b0caf2.ukvs
[1548318103019] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082143-861f2b2e872125f31a61bed8141f1c8be04c48e
bbebb2a49b4fdf2d9d6999f77-213c79bda7483d87609287142b86bc8d6b8c66306662236455507be046b0caf2.ukvs.gz
[1548318103025] Finished creating block 3 of size 14516 bytes in 330 milliseconds
======================
[1548318104030] Generating block 4
[1548318104355] Saving 92165 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082144-213c79bda7483d87609287142b86bc8d6b8c66
306662236455507be046b0caf2-4fa056c839656babdd8c8428df006590d7f48a4fbcd7df2d76d3d77110eba056.ukvs
[1548318104357] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082144-213c79bda7483d87609287142b86bc8d6b8c663
06662236455507be046b0caf2-4fa056c839656babdd8c8428df006590d7f48a4fbcd7df2d76d3d77110eba056.ukvs.gz
[1548318104362] Finished creating block 4 of size 16321 bytes in 332 milliseconds
======================
[1548318105366] Generating block 5
[1548318105689] Saving 92646 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082145-4fa056c839656babdd8c8428df006590d7f48a
4fbcd7df2d76d3d77110eba056-70524610a0b3736de2c9b7ea9988ed1cedbcf3098c0f35d2cfed5f89d3193a45.ukvs
[1548318105691] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082145-4fa056c839656babdd8c8428df006590d7f48a4
fbcd7df2d76d3d77110eba056-70524610a0b3736de2c9b7ea9988ed1cedbcf3098c0f35d2cfed5f89d3193a45.ukvs.gz
[1548318105697] Finished creating block 5 of size 16136 bytes in 331 milliseconds
======================
[1548318106701] Generating block 6
[1548318107032] Saving 90681 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082147-70524610a0b3736de2c9b7ea9988ed1cedbcf3
098c0f35d2cfed5f89d3193a45-8d40976dcce88bbc9c5907618e2f95beaa7484426fff509b9fa42a92719edae3.ukvs
[1548318107033] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082147-70524610a0b3736de2c9b7ea9988ed1cedbcf30
98c0f35d2cfed5f89d3193a45-8d40976dcce88bbc9c5907618e2f95beaa7484426fff509b9fa42a92719edae3.ukvs.gz
[1548318107038] Finished creating block 6 of size 15756 bytes in 337 milliseconds
======================
[1548318108043] Generating block 7
[1548318108379] Saving 89160 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082148-8d40976dcce88bbc9c5907618e2f95beaa7484
426fff509b9fa42a92719edae3-e0ef8e7677778fc430d6142b87204f0510e81007c4019747e32e76851e30f657.ukvs
[1548318108381] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082148-8d40976dcce88bbc9c5907618e2f95beaa74844
26fff509b9fa42a92719edae3-e0ef8e7677778fc430d6142b87204f0510e81007c4019747e32e76851e30f657.ukvs.gz
[1548318108387] Finished creating block 7 of size 15604 bytes in 344 milliseconds
======================
[1548318109391] Generating block 8
[1548318109718] Saving 89228 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082149-e0ef8e7677778fc430d6142b87204f0510e810
07c4019747e32e76851e30f657-59851a4cb1e29b9e178c24bfb31a2043762c554d34ac1a34e3cf0880ee7d87be.ukvs
[1548318109720] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082149-e0ef8e7677778fc430d6142b87204f0510e8100
7c4019747e32e76851e30f657-59851a4cb1e29b9e178c24bfb31a2043762c554d34ac1a34e3cf0880ee7d87be.ukvs.gz
[1548318109725] Finished creating block 8 of size 15550 bytes in 334 milliseconds
======================
[1548318110729] Generating block 9
[1548318111066] Saving 87937 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082151-59851a4cb1e29b9e178c24bfb31a2043762c55
4d34ac1a34e3cf0880ee7d87be-2b01231e1a07d92bc5e5aa3b4b3a76e3672384df69013c3537a2cd7505cd23d0.ukvs
[1548318111068] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082151-59851a4cb1e29b9e178c24bfb31a2043762c554
d34ac1a34e3cf0880ee7d87be-2b01231e1a07d92bc5e5aa3b4b3a76e3672384df69013c3537a2cd7505cd23d0.ukvs.gz
[1548318111074] Finished creating block 9 of size 15354 bytes in 345 milliseconds
======================
[1548318112078] Generating block 10
[1548318112400] Saving 88688 bytes to ./blocks/100/20190124082152-2b01231e1a07d92bc5e5aa3b4b3a76e3672384
df69013c3537a2cd7505cd23d0-5da03e339e52bafcc82b64c1636adff474a94df46a057e9356e74f70eba8b26f.ukvs
[1548318112402] Compressing block to ./blocks/100/20190124082152-2b01231e1a07d92bc5e5aa3b4b3a76e3672384d
f69013c3537a2cd7505cd23d0-5da03e339e52bafcc82b64c1636adff474a94df46a057e9356e74f70eba8b26f.ukvs.gz
[1548318112408] Finished creating block 10 of size 15223 bytes in 330 milliseconds
======================
Figure 18: e shell script uses the Python function generate block() to generate ten 100-record blocks.
pages even without involving the Archival Fixity server. On av-
erage, it takes about 1.25X, 4X, and 36X longer to disseminate a
manifest to perma.cc, archive.org, and webcitation.org, re-
spectively, than archive.is, while it takes 3.5X longer to dissemi-
nate a block to archive.org than perma.cc. e Block approach
performs 4.46X faster than the Atomic approach on verifying the
xity of archived pages.
We believe that the Atomic and Block approaches can be adopted
to verify xity of particular archived web pages with important con-
tent. Some future improvements can be applied to those approaches
so they become scalable and can work with any number of memen-
tos. Varying or increasing the block size in the Block approach
might be one potential solution to improve its performance and
reduce number of resources created in archives. Caching archived
!context ["http://oduwsdl.github.io/contexts/fixity"]
!fields {keys: ["surt"]}
!id {uri: "https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/"}
!meta {created_at: "20190111181327"}
!meta {prev_block: "sha256:d4eb1190f9aaae9542fd3ad8a3c4519450cfb00845b632eb2b3f4f098a34144d"}
!meta {type: "FixityBlock"}
org,archive,web)/web/19961022175434/http:/www.search.com:80 {"created": "Wed, 12 Dec 2018 08:54:26 GMT",
"hash": "md5:d6332bc887d295fa02d0e36fe4e2991b sha256:967a9261bb201830224cdb40740a7bdd2b05aa6287b6bbfa3c
f1e8bca9a4e62d", "hash-constructor": "(curl -s '$uri-m' && echo -n '$Content-Type $X-Archive-Orig-date')
| tee >(sha256sum) >(md5sum) >/dev/null | cut -d ' ' -f 1 | paste -d':' <(echo -e 'md5\nsha256') - |
paste -d' ' - -", "http-headers": {"Content-Type": "text/html","Preference-Applied": "original-links,
original-content", "X-Archive-Orig-date": "Tuesday, 22-Oct-96 17:54:34 GMT"}, "memento-datetime": "Tue,
22 Oct 1996 17:54:34 GMT", "uri-m": "https://web.archive.org/web/19961022175434/http://www.search.com:80
/", "uri-r": "http://www.search.com:80/"}
org,archive,web)/web/19961023041557/http:/www.aaas.org:80 {"created": "Wed, 12 Dec 2018 09:02:44 GMT",
"hash": "md5:999a5d5012b8072565642e5b55507a3b sha256:02c777b5c3961c05602bd876243db130f84cc66895c3a4cef7
8d52afa4beac4b", "hash-constructor": "(curl -s '$uri-m' && echo -n '$Content-Type $X-Archive-Orig-date
$X-Archive-Orig-last-modified') | tee >(sha256sum) >(md5sum) >/dev/null | cut -d ' ' -f 1 | paste -d':'
<(echo -e 'md5\nsha256') - | paste -d' ' - -", "http-headers": {"Content-Type": "text/html", "Preference
-Applied": "original-links, original-content", "X-Archive-Orig-date": "Wednesday, 23-Oct-96 04:15:57
GMT", "X-Archive-Orig-last-modified": "Friday, 18-Oct-96 14:07:23 GMT"}, "memento-datetime": "Wed, 23
Oct 1996 04:15:57 GMT", "uri-m": "https://web.archive.org/web/19961023041557/http://www.aaas.org:80/",
"uri-r": "http://www.aaas.org:80/"}
org,archive,web)/web/19961219082428/http:/www.sho.com:80 {"created": "Wed, 12 Dec 2018 08:58:35 GMT",
"hash": "md5:07c132d54ce420f1132affec24624cdf sha256:41186b26814213f587493da45d2148db962130fd47a8616c97
f9d4335e5e217a", "hash-constructor": "(curl -s '$uri-m' && echo -n '$Content-Type $X-Archive-Orig-date
$X-Archive-Orig-last-modified') | tee >(sha256sum) >(md5sum) >/dev/null | cut -d ' ' -f 1 | paste -d':'
<(echo -e 'md5\nsha256') - | paste -d' ' - -", "http-headers": {"Content-Type": "text/html", "Preference
-Applied": "original-links, original-content", "X-Archive-Orig-date": "Thu, 19 Dec 1996 08:24:34 GMT",
"X-Archive-Orig-last-modified": "Thu, 03 Oct 1996 00:12:06 GMT"}, "memento-datetime": "Thu, 19 Dec 1996
08:24:28 GMT", "uri-m": "https://web.archive.org/web/19961219082428/http://www.sho.com:80/", "uri-r":
"http://www.sho.com:80/"}
org,archive,web)/web/19961223174001/http:/www2.reference.com:80 {"created": "Wed, 12 Dec 2018 09:06:49
GMT", "hash": "md5:b066243baa7a81d414c3e53b8a4982ef sha256:5b2efc24da6357062c2d9879b0e333359d20e7968244
f73801a599847f075b08", "hash-constructor": "(curl -s '$uri-m' && echo -n '$Content-Type $X-Archive-Orig
-date $X-Archive-Orig-etag $X-Archive-Orig-last-modified') | tee >(sha256sum) >(md5sum) >/dev/null | cut
-d ' ' -f 1 | paste -d':' <(echo -e 'md5\nsha256') - | paste -d' ' - -", "http-headers": {"Content-Type"
:"text/html", "Preference-Applied": "original-links, original-content", "X-Archive-Orig-date": "Mon, 23
Dec 1996 17:39:46 GMT", "X-Archive-Orig-etag": "\"bb98a-5a9-31ab9402\"", "X-Archive-Orig-last-modified":
"Wed, 29 May 1996 00:02:10 GMT"}, "memento-datetime": "Mon, 23 Dec 1996 17:40:01 GMT", "uri-m": "https:
//web.archive.org/web/19961223174001/http://www2.reference.com:80/", "uri-r": "http://www2.reference.com
:80/"}
...
Figure 19: Block 1 contains 100 records (only four records are shown).
$ python fixity.py disseminate_block http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks
https://perma.cc/8YG3-X7KN
https://web.archive.org/web/20190121054059/https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks/7bbf757046ac0a0a6001
5a1cb847c3189160d18c809b210073822df157609e01
Figure 20: An example of disseminating one block to two archives. e URI http://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks always redirects
to the most recent published block. In this example the URI redirects to block 1: https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/blocks/7bbf75704
6ac0a0a60015a1cb847c3189160d18c809b210073822df157609e01.
manifests in the Archival Fixity server should also improve the
performance of the two approaches, so instead of discovering those
manifests from the archives, we may used cached copies in the
Archival Fixity server.
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SN Status BlockIdx TotalT LookupT GenerationT VerifyT URIM
1 VERIFIED 1 0.82443 0.00144 0.82205 0.00073 https://web.archive.org/web/201512210445
08/http://www.justfocus.fr:80/arts/genie-leonard-de-vinci-pinacotheque.html
2 VERIFIED 1 0.53954 0.00157 0.53710 0.00063 https://web.archive.org/web/201509260235
12/http://evenium.fr:80/c/index
3 VERIFIED 1 0.59041 0.00145 0.58795 0.00076 https://web.archive.org/web/201511250509
59/http://centmillemilliards.com:80/wp/en/produit/humans-of-paris
4 VERIFIED 1 0.67178 0.00147 0.66912 0.00094 https://web.archive.org/web/201412080344
42/http://www.bergrettung-salzburg.at:80/home/
5 VERIFIED 1 0.59357 0.00169 0.59083 0.00081 https://web.archive.org/web/201403281737
22/http://carpalaid.com:80/
6 VERIFIED 1 0.80477 0.00161 0.80213 0.00078 https://web.archive.org/web/201410151107
04/http://www.airfrance.co.ao/cgi-bin/AF/AO/en/common/home/flights/ticket-plane.do
7 VERIFIED 1 0.67093 0.00176 0.66798 0.00093 https://web.archive.org/web/201707030456
56/https://www.abrasco.org.br/site/noticias/institucional/abrasco-convoca-comunidade-cientifica-para-a-m
archa-pela-ciencia/28036/
8 VERIFIED 1 0.82797 0.00154 0.82542 0.00078 https://web.archive.org/web/201707010935
44/https://sciencepop.fr/2017/04/13/climat-vaccin-ogm-francais-acceptent-science/
9 VERIFIED 1 0.76563 0.00156 0.76283 0.00099 https://web.archive.org/web/201702240949
32/http://www.damemagazine.com/2017/01/26/my-time-standing-rock-taught-me-what-we-need-do-resist
10 VERIFIED 1 0.79252 0.00172 0.78977 0.00078 https://web.archive.org/web/201605091517
44/http://www.ibc.ca:80/ab/disaster/fortmacfire
...
Figure 21: e output of verify block() (only the results of verifying 10 mementos out of 1,000 are shown). e column Status indicates
whether the xity of a memento is veried or not. e column BlockIdx is the block number used to verify the memento. e columns
LookupT, GenerationT, and VerifyT show the time taken for lookup the xity information in blocks, generating current xity information,
and verifying/comparing the current xity with the discovered xity information from blocks, respectively. e column TotalT shows the
overall time taken to verify the xity of the memento.
$ curl -I https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181222/https://web.archive.org/web/20171115140705
/http://rln.fm/
HTTP/2 302 Found
content-length: 501
content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:16:40 GMT
location: https://manifest.ws-dl.cs.odu.edu/manifest/20181212074423/bd669de8835e38d54651fe9d04709515beec
0c727db82a5366f4bc2506e103d8/https://web.archive.org/web/20171115140705/http://rln.fm/
server: ArchivalFixity/0.1
Figure 22: Discovering the closest manifest to December 22, 2018 for the memento web. archive. org/web/2017111 5140705/hp://rln.fm/.
Figure 23: e eect of the selected number of records per block.
Figure 24: Generating manifests of mementos.
Figure 25: Disseminating manifests to four archives.
Figure 26: Disseminating blocks to two archives.
Figure 27: Discovering manifests by both approaches.
Figure 28: Verifying mementos by both approaches.
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